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Jane Matthews Glenn*

Promissory Estoppel, Proprietary
Estoppel and Constructive Trust
in Canada: "What's in a name?"

This paper explores the similarities and differences between promissory
estoppel, proprietary estoppel and the remedial constructive trust. Although the
three are quite different at one level, as the first is a defence to an action, the
second a cause of action as well as a defence, and the third simply a remedy
to a cause of action, a closer examination reveals certain underlying similarities.
The comparison highlights proprietary estoppel, an oft-overlooked concept in
Canada, but which is comparable to promissory estoppel at the substantive level
and the constructive trust at the remedial level.
Cet article compare la pr6clusion promissaire, la preclusion proprietale et la
fiducie judiciaire 6 caractere rdparatoire. Les trois concepts sont tres diff6rents
en ce sens que le premier est une defense une action, le deuxieme une cause
d'action aussi bien qu'une defense, et le troisi~me un simple remade d une cause
d'action. Cela dit, un examen plus approfondi souligne des points de convergence
intdressants. La comparaison met en valeur la preclusion propridtale, un concept
souvent ignord au Canada mais qui se compare , la preclusion promissaire sur le
plan substantif et J la fiducie judiciaire sur le plan des rem~des.

*
Professor of Law and Member of the Institute of Comparative Law, Faculty of Law, McGill
University, Montreal, Canada. This article represents a revised version of a paper presented at the
XVIIth World Congress of Comparative Law held in Utrecht, The Netherlands, in July 2006. It was
subsequently published in a thematic volume of Congress papers, (Bdn&licte Fauvarque-Cosson, ed.,
La confiance lgitime et l'estoppel (Paris: Soci~t6 de 1dgislation comparde, 2007)) and is republished
here with permission of the editor. I am grateful to my colleagues, Professors Dennis Klinck, Lionel
Smith and Stephen Smith, for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper.
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That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet.'
Introduction
The common law is like an English country garden, where a wide variety of
plants of all shapes, sizes, colours, provenance and purpose thrive together
in apparent disorder but with striking overall effect. Most of the plants are
native species of ancient lineage, although judicious pruning and crossfertilization have often changed their original aspect and adapted them to
new uses; some of the plants have been transplanted from elsewhere, and
their survival has depended on the suitability of soil and climate as well as
the care and attention of gardeners.
England and other common law Commonwealth jurisdictions, except
Canada, have concentrated much care and attention on cultivation of the
doctrine of estoppel, so that there is now a profusion of estoppels, with
promissory and proprietary estoppel having pride of place; none of these
jurisdictions has shown particular interest in cultivating the remedial
constructive trust. Common law Canada, on the other hand, has tended to
ignore estoppel, being content to import English examples without more,
and has concentrated its attention on cultivation of the constructive trust,
particularly a vigorous American-style remedial constructive trust.
The range of plants in an English country garden makes them often
difficult to classify - to determine whether they are plants of different
genera, different species of the same genus, or simply different varieties
of the same species. So it is with the common law. This paper looks at
promissory estoppel, proprietary estoppel and the remedial constructive
trust - more precisely, the unjust enrichment constructive trust - with a
view to determining whether, like plants, they are fundamentally different,
somewhat similar or basically the same.
In one sense, this is admittedly an unparallel comparison, as the
two estoppels are either procedural or substantive concepts whereas the
1.

William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet,Act II, Scene 2.
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constructive trust is simply a remedy to a substantive claim based, in
our case, on unjust enrichment. In this sense, therefore, the appropriate
comparison would appear to be between estoppel, on the one hand, and
unjust enrichment, on the other. But both are broad concepts, so that a
comparison between them would be correspondingly broad. In another
sense, however, the chosen comparison is appropriate as it highlights
proprietary estoppel, an oft-overlooked plant growing in the shadow of
its showier neighbours. Proprietary estoppel is something of a hybrid, as
we shall see, and an analysis of it calls for a comparison with promissory
estoppel at the substantive level and with the constructive trust at the
remedial level.'
The paper draws extensively, although not exclusively, for its analysis
on appellate level cases decided in the last decade (1996-2006), using the
database of the Canadian Legal Information Institute (CanLII).3
I. HistoricalDevelopment
All three concepts - promissory and proprietary estoppel, and the
constructive trust - were developed by the courts of equity to attenuate
injustices resulting from application of strict legal rules, with these
rules being basically contractual in the case of promissory estoppel and
proprietary in the cases of proprietary estoppel and constructive trusts.
All three trace their origins back to at least the eighteenth century, if not
earlier, although these early roots are strongest in the case of constructive
trusts. Both proprietary and promissory estoppel were rationalized by late
nineteenth century court decisions. And all three concepts were further
shaped by the influence of Lord Denning in the latter half of the twentieth
century.
Promissory estoppel: The precursor of promissory estoppel, estoppel
by representation, is ancient, although promissory estoppel itself did not
emerge until the late nineteenth century, notably in the 1877 House of
Lords' decision in Hughes v. MetropolitanRailway Co.4 It then lay more
or less dormant until it was taken up by Lord Denning in CentralLondon
Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd., decided in 1946,1 and was
2.
On the possible misleading effect of metaphors on the classification of concepts, see Stephen
Waddams, "The Relation of Unjust Enrichment to Other Legal Concepts" in Jason W. Neyers, Mitchell
Mclnnes & Stephen G.A. Pitel, eds., UnderstandingUnjust Enrichment (Oxford: Hart, 2004) 405 at
407-08.
3.
Online : <http://www.canlii.orgl>.
4.
[1877] 2 A.C.D. 439. See Hanbury & Martin, Modern Equity, 16th ed. by Jill E. Martin (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 2001) at 892; Cheshire & Bum, Modern Law ofReal Property, 16th ed. by E.H. Burn
(London: Butterworths, 2000) at 649.
5.
[1947] 1 K.B. 130.
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refined subsequently. High Trees is generally regarded as the English highwater mark of promissory estoppel, and the most interesting doctrinal
developments in regard to it since then have come from Australia, with
courts and scholars there advocating unification of the various types
of estoppel - including promissory and proprietary estoppel - into one
overarching concept. 6
Proprietaryestoppel: Proprietary estoppel owes its main impetus to an
1866 House of Lords' case, Ramsden v. Dyson. Lord Cranworth, speaking
for the majority, there articulated the equitable principle in narrowly
circumscribed terms based on mistake:
If a stranger begins to build on my land supposing it to be his own, and
I, perceiving his mistake, abstain from setting him right, and leave him
to persevere in his error, a Court of equity will not allow me afterwards
to assert my title to the land on which he had expended money on the
supposition that the land was his own....
But it will be observed that to raise such an equity two things are required,
first, that the person expending the money supposes himself to be building
on his own land; and, secondly, that the real owner at the time of the
expenditure knows that the land belongs to him and not to the person
expending the money in the belief that he is the owner.7
The idea of mistake was emphasized in 1880 by Fry J. in Willmott v. Barber,
in his oft-cited statement of the five "probanda" to be demonstrated by the
person seeking to raise an estoppel: (1) that the plaintiff must have made a
mistake as to his legal rights; (2) that he have expended some money or done
some other act to his detriment on the faith of his mistaken belief; (3) that
the defendant (the person sought to be estopped) know of the existence of
his own right which is inconsistent with the right claimed by the plaintiff;
(4) that the defendant know of the plaintiff's mistaken belief of his rights;
and (5) that the defendant have encouraged the plaintiff in his expenditure
of money or other acts, either directly or by abstaining from asserting his
legal right. 8 This mistake-based approach is sometimes called "estoppel by
acquiescence" and is clearly accepted in Canada today.9

6.
See Waltons Stores (Interstate)Ltd. v. Maher (1988), 164 C.L.R. 387 (H.C.A.) [Waltons Stores]
and Elizabeth Cooke, The Modern Law of Estoppel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
7.
(1866) L.R. I H.L. 129 at 140-41.
8. (1880) 15 Ch. D. 96 at 105-06 [ Wilmott].
9. E.g., The Queen v. Smith (1980), 113 D.L.R. (3d) 522 (F.C.A.) at 580-84 (equitable doctrine
of estoppel by acquiescence applied to Crown in claim for value of improvements to land in Indian
reserve).
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On the other hand, Lord Kingsdown, in dissent in Ramsden v. Dyson,
favoured the application of a wider principle:
The rule of law applicable to the case appears to me to be this: If a man,
under a verbal agreement with a landlord [the case concerned a dispute
between landlord and tenant] for a certain interest in land, or, what
amounts to the same thing, under an expectation, created or encouraged
by the landlord, that he shall have a certain interest, takes possession of
such land, with the consent of the landlord, and upon the faith of such
promise or expectation, with the knowledge of the landlord, and without
objection by him, lays out money upon the land, a Court of equity will
compel the landlord to give effect to such promise or expectation.'"
This wider approach is often described as "estoppel by encouragement."
It came to the fore in the 1960s and 1970s, notably under the creative
influence of Lord Denning,"I and is the main way in which a proprietary
estoppel arises today. However, as we shall see, the idea of mistake as
the sole source of proprietary estoppel continues to hold some sway in
Canada.
Constructive trust: Equity's long association with the trust, which dates
back to at least the fifteenth century, means that the constructive trust as an
institutional complement to the express trust developed continuously and
incrementally, to encompass different categories of defendants; this took
place largely between the seventeenth and nineteeth centuries, 2 without
the periods of quiescence experienced with promissory and proprietary
estoppel. Indeed, the 1726 touchstone case of Keech v. Sandford 13
continues to be taught and cited today. England flirted briefly with the idea
of a remedial constructive trust in the 1960s and 1970s, again under the
influence of Lord Denning,14 but it was the Supreme Court of Canada that
put the doctrine on a principled footing in its 1980 landmark decision in
Pettkus v. Becker. 5
10. Supra note 7 at 170. Although this statement refers to the landlord-tenant relationship, it has been
applied more widely. See, e.g., Plimmer v. Mayor of Wellington (1884), 9 A.C.D. 699 (P.C.). The 1862
case of Dillwyn v. Llewelyn (1862) 4 De G.F. & J. 517, 45 E.R. 1284 (Ch.) (son building on land owned
by father on written assurance that property be given to son) is sometimes referred to as the origin of
proprietary estoppel, but this is said to read too much into the case (Hanbury & Martin, supra note 4
at 897) as it was an incomplete gift case decided more on contractual grounds, with construction being
treated as analogous to part performance, and seen as providing consideration.
11. E.g., Inwards v. Baker, [1965] 2 Q.B. 29 (C.A.).
12. " Donovan W.M. Waters, Mark R. Gillen & Lionel D. Smith, Waters 'Law of Trusts in Canada,3rd
ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005) at 459 [Waters].
13. (1726) Sel. Ca. t. King 61, 25 E.R. 223 (Ch).
14. E.g., Hussey v. Palmer [1972] 3 All E.R. 744 (C.A.); Waters, supra note 12 at 461-3. See also
Bannisterv. Bannister, [1948] 2 All E.R. 133 (C.A.).
15. [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834.
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II.Principles
Promissory estoppel, proprietary estoppel and constructive trust are
creatures of equity, and equity is a court of conscience. Unconscionability,
and the remedying ofunconscionable conduct, is thus said to be the unifying
principle for the two estoppels, 6 as each originates with a holding out by
one party and has at its heart the detrimental reliance on this holding out
by the other party. Similarly, good conscience is identified by the Supreme
Court as the "common concept unifying the various instances in which a
constructive trust may be found", 7 whether it be a remedial constructive
trust imposed in situations of unjust enrichment of one party by another
or an institutional constructive trust imposed in more disparate, categorybased, situations. I"
Promissory estoppel: Promissory estoppel is an equitable extension of
the older "estoppel by representation." Both have three basic elements:
a representation by one party to another; action by the other party in
reliance on the representation; and resulting detriment to the party acting
in reliance. The requirements concerning reliance and detriment are
substantially similar in the two cases,' 9 and the Supreme Court of Canada
recently described them as follows:
Detrimental reliance encompasses two distinct, but interrelated, concepts:
reliance and detriment. The former requires a finding that the party
seeking to establish the estoppel changed his or her course of conduct by
acting or abstaining from acting in reliance upon the assumption, thereby
altering his or her legal position. If the first step is met, the second

16. Margaret Halliwell, "Estoppel: Unconscionability as a Cause ofAction" (1994) 14 L.S. 15; Cheshire
& Bum, supra note 4 at 651.
17. Soulos v. Korkontzilas, [1997]2 S.C.R. 27 at 236(McLachlin J.) [Soulos].
18. McLachlin J. explained the institutional constructive trust as follows: "The history of the law of
constructive trust... suggests that the constructive trust is an ancient and eclectic institution imposed by
law not only to remedy unjust enrichment, but to hold persons in different situations to high standards
of trust and probity and prevent them from retaining property which in 'good conscience' they should
not be permitted to retain. This served the end ... of protecting relationships of trust and the institutions
that depend on these relationships. These goals were accomplished by treating the person holding the
property as a trustee of it for the wronged person's benefit, even though there was no true trust created
by intention. In England, the trust thus created was thought of as a real or 'institutional' trust." Ibid.
at 228. Also Graham Virgo, "Review of D Wright, The Remedial Constructive Trust (Butterworths,
Sydney 1998)" (1999) 58 Cambridge L. J. 645 at 645: "Although some judges have recently toyed
with the introduction of the remedial constructive trust into English law, it has not been recognised
here. For us the constructive trust is an institution, which is recognised by operation of law in certain
"
identifiable circumstances ...
19. Although there is some suggestion that the requirement of detriment is less stringent, perhaps
even non-existent, for promissory estoppel than for estoppel by representation: see, e.g., Hanbury &
Martin, supra note 4 at 893; Cooke, siipranote 6 at 56, 62; S.M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts,5th ed.
(Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, 2005) at paras. 198-99.
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requires a finding that, should the other party be allowed to abandon the
assumption, detriment will be suffered by the estoppel raiser because of
the change from his or her assumed position.2"

The principal difference between estoppel by representation and promissory
estoppel is in the nature of the representation. Although both accept that
the representation can be by words, conduct, 21 or silence, 22 estoppel by
representation requires that the representation be of a present existing fact
or law (hence it is sometimes referred to as "estoppel by representation of
fact") whereas promissory estoppel calls for a representation, or promise,
of future conduct.
Where, by words or conduct, a person makes an unambiguous
representation as to his future conduct, intending the representation to
be relied on, and to affect the legal relations between the parties, and
the representee alters his position in reliance on it, the representor will.
be unable to act inconsistently with the representation if by so doing the
representee would be prejudiced.23

The emphasis on representation, or holding out, thus gives promissory
estoppel, as all other estoppels, a certain flavour of unilateralism: the
representation, or holding out, is by one party and the action in reliance is
by another and subsequent to the holding out. However, a certain element
of mutuality is also required, as the statement or conduct must be known to
the other party and acted upon. This is described as "crossing the line."
All estoppels must involve some statement or conduct by the party
alleged to be estopped on which the alleged representee was entitled to
rely and did rely. In this sense all estoppels may be regardedas requiring
some manifest representationwhich crosses the line between representor
and representee,either by statement or conduct...

20. Ryan v. Moore, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 53 at 85-86 (Bastarache J speaking for the Court, and citing a
1937 Australian High Court decision, Grundt v. Great Boulder ProprietaryGoldMines Ltd. (1937),
59 C.L.R. 641, in support).
21. This is sometimes called "estoppel by conduct." See, e.g., Chan v. Lee (Estate),2004 BCCA 644,
249 D.L.R. (41) 38.
22. I.e., "estoppel by acquiescence." Silence can give rise to an estoppel only where the party is
under an obligation to speak: Ryan v. Moore, supranote 20 at 88.
23. Hanbury & Martin, supra note 4 at 892, citing Combe v. Combe, [1951] 2 K.B. 215 (C.A.) at 220
[emphasis in original]. A recent, and oft-cited, definition of promissory estoppel by the Supreme Court
of Canada (by Sopinka J. in Maraclev. TravellersIndemnity Co. of Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 50 at 57)
ignores this distinction: "The principles of promissory estoppel are well settled. The party relying on
the doctrine must establish that the other party has, by words or conduct, made a promise or assurance
which was intended to affect their legal relationship and to be acted on. Furthermore, the representee
must establish that, in reliance on the representation, he acted on it or in some way changed his
position."
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There cannot be any estoppel unless the alleged representor has
said or done something, or failed to do something, with the result that
- across the line between the parties - his action or inaction has produced
some belief or expectation in the mind of the alleged representee, so that,
depending on the circumstances, it would thereafter no longer be right
to allow the alleged representor to resile by challenging the belief or
expectation which he has engendered. 24
The mutuality is strongest in "estoppel by convention," identified by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Ryan v. Moore as a form of estoppel
by representation of fact or promissory estoppel (the Court also included
proprietary estoppel in the list) requiring not just a representation by one
party to the other, but a common assumption shared by both parties: "[t]he
crucial requirement for estoppel by convention, which distinguishes it
from the other types of estoppel, is that at the material time both parties
must be of 'like mind.' ... Mutual assent is what distinguishes the estoppel
' 25
by convention from other types of estoppel.
Promissory and related estoppels (i.e., estoppels by representation or
convention) are described as "true estoppels ' '26 in the sense that they can
be raised as a defence to an action but cannot themselves found a cause of
action: they can be used as a shield, but not a sword. However, this does
not mean that promissory estoppel cannot be invoked by a plaintiff, who
may do so if he or she has an independent cause of action. In this case the
plaintiff is using estoppel not as a sword but as a defence to a defence,
as it were, a distinction which non-lawyers might regard as overly fine.
Whether or not promissory estoppel should be overtly available as a sword,
as well as a shield, is the subject of doctrinal controversy elsewhere in the
common law Commonwealth, with Australian courts leading the way. 27
Promissory and related estoppels have been applied in a number of
recent Canadian appellate cases, with most involving its use as a defence
to a defence. In Maracle v. TravellersIndemnity Co of Canada,28 the issue
was whether the plaintiff could claim under an insurance policy because
the defendant was estopped from invoking a statutory limitation to the
action; in Hansen v. British Columbia,29 it involved a limitation on the

24. Ryan v. Moore, supranote 20 at 82-83 (Bastarache J. quoting The "August Leonhardt", [1985]
2 Lloyd's L.R. 28 (C.A.) at 34-35 with added emphasis).
25. Ibid. at 82 (Bastarache J.).
26. "Estoppe, cometh of the French word estoupe, from whence the English word stopped; and it is
called an estoppel or conclusion, because a man's own act or acceptance stoppeth or closeth up his mouth
to allege or plead the truth": Co. Litt 352a, as cited in Halliwell, supra note 16 at 20.
27. E.g., Waltons Stores, supranote 6.
28. [199112 S.C.R. 50; also Marchischukv. Dominion IndustrialSupplies Ltd, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 61.
29. (2000), 186 D.L.R. (4'h) 685 (B.C.C.A.).
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time for claiming compensation under the ExpropriationAct; in Chan v.
Lee (Estate),30 it was a limitation period under the Wills VariationAct; and
in Ryan v. Moore,3 ' a limitation to an action under the Survival ofActions
Act.
The issue of whether promissory estoppel can be used as a sword as
well as a shield has been raised in Canadian courts on several occasions.
A 2002 Nova Scotia Court of Appeal case suggested that "[t]he authorities
3' 2
are not clear whether promissory estoppel can create a cause of action,
but most cases would agree with an Ontario Court of Appeal affirmation in
2004 that "[i]t is well established that promissory estoppel can be used only
as a shield and not as a sword."33 Promissory estoppel has therefore been
held not to support a union grievance over the withdrawal of benefits that
had been provided outside the context of a collective agreement,3 4 an action
against the then Premier of Ontario for damages for breach of assurances
that. a waste disposal site would not be permitted in an environmentally
sensitive area,35 an action to enforce a performance guarantee given by
the defendant to a third party3 6 or an action to claim priority over a prior
registered encumbrance.37 The most considered discussion is found in the
waste disposal site case, Reclamation Systems Inc. v. Rae, in which the
Court first recognized that some cases had "alluded to the argument that
the sword/shield distinction may become extinct,"38 and went on to say
that, nevertheless,
...
there have been no cases in Ontario in which estoppel has been
utilized other than as a defence. The Ontario Court of Appeal has set
out definitively in Gilbert Steel ...that estoppel can only be used as
30. Supra note 21.
31. Supra note 20.
32. Fordv.Kennie (2002), 210 N.S.R. (2d) 50 (N.S.C.A.) at 60.
33.
Doef's Iron Works Ltd. v. Mortgage Corp. Canada Inc. (2004), 134 A.C.W.S. (3d) 64 (Ont.
C.A.) at para: 2 (citing Conwest Exploration Co. v. Letain, [1964] S.C.R. 20 as authority). See, e.g.,
Kahle v. Ritter, 2002 BCSC 199 (citing Canadian SuperiorOil Ltd v. Hambly, [1970] S.C.R. 932 as
authority).
34. E.g., Smoky River Coal Ltd. v. United Steelworkers of America, Local 7621 (1985), 60 A.R.
36 (C.A.); InternationalBrotherhoodof Boilermakers,Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgersand
Helpers, Local D331 v. LaFarge CanadaInc., 1998 ABQB 802, 66 Alta. L.R. (3d) 396; Nova Scotia
Government Employees Union,Local 18 v. University College of Cape Breton (1998), 172 N.S.R. (2d)
282 (S.C.); Brandt Tractor Ltd. v. PardeeEquipment Employees Association, 2006 ABQB 327, 399
A.R. 290.
35. Reclamation Systems Inc. v. Rae (1996), 27 O.R. (3d) 419 (Gen. Div.).
36. Delta Western Fuel v. Byblow, 2000 YTSC 544.
37. FraserValley Credit Union v. Siba, 2001 BCSC 744,42 R.P.R. (3d) 135.
38. Supra note 35 at 456 (Cumming J. referring to Tudale Explorations Ltd. v. Bruce (1978), 88
D.L.R. (3d) 594 (Ont. Div. Ct.)); see also Petridis v. Shabinsky (1982), 132 D.L.R. (3d) 430 (Ont.
H.Ct.J.); ML Baxter Equipment Ltd. v. Geac CanadaLtd. (1982), 133 D.L.R. (3d) 372 (Ont. H.Ct.J.);
and Edwardsv. Harris-Intertype(Canada)Ltd. (1984), 9 D.L.R. (4 1) 319 (Ont. C.A.).
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a shield and this law has not yet been overturned. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court of Canada, in CanadianSuperior Oil ... has stated that
promissory estoppel cannot be used as a cause of action. There is nothing
that promissory estoppel can be
in Canadian law to conclusively indicate
39
used as a sword in addition to a shield.

Most of the recent Canadian cases discussed the issue in the context of the
definitional requirement for promissory estoppel that the representation
"affect the legal relations between the parties." 40 They relied either on
a line of Supreme Court of Canada cases, culminating in Maracle v.
Travellers Indemnity,41 in which the Court stated, somewhat neutrally, that

the promise or assurance must have been "intended to affect their legal
relationship"; or they relied on a leading Canadian contract textbook in
which the author stressed, more explicitly, that there must be "an existing
legal-relationship between the parties at the time the statement on which

the estoppel isfounded was made. '42 In other words, most Canadian courts
are of the view that the requirement that promissory estoppel "affect legal
relations" is limited to a downward modification of existing legal relations
(which implies that it can be used only as a shield) rather than extending to
a creation of new legal relations (which would permit its use as a sword).43
As Smith J. put it in Fraser Valley Credit Union v. Siba:
Thus, it appears that some legal relations between the parties must be
extant at the time of the promise... A promise to create some kind of
contractual relations, where none yet exist, is not captured under the
language of promissory estoppel. 44

This view was challenged before the British Columbia Court of Appeal
in 2003, in M (N.) v. A. (A.T). 45 The issue was whether the Court could

39. Supra note 35 at 456-57 (referring to Gilbert Steel Ltd. v. University ConstructionLtd. (1976),
67 D.L.R. (3d) 606 (Ont. C.A.) and Canadian Superior Oil v. Hambly, supranote 33.
40. See text accompanying note 23.
41. Supranote 23. Earlier cases include Conwest Explorationv. Letain, supranote 33; John Burrows
Ltd. v. Subsurface Surveys Ltd., [1968] S.C.R. 607; and EngineeredHomes Ltd. v. Mason,.[19831 1
S.C.R. 641. See also Owen Sound PublicLibraryBoard v. Mial DevelopmentsLtd. (1979), 102 D.L.R.
(3d) 685 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, (1980) 31 N.R. 449n (S.C.C.).
42. G.H.L. Fridman, The Law of Contract, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2006) at 127
[emphasis added].
43. The upward modification of a contract (in the sense of one party obtaining additional rights
under the contract without providing anything in return) is not enforceable under estoppel, as this
would entail using estoppel as a sword. See, e.g., the union grievance cases at supra note 34; but
see Williams v. Roffey Bros. Ltd., [1991] 1 Q.B. 1 (C.A.) (agreement to increase compensation under
a construction contract held to be supported by consideration; possible application of promissory
estoppel had it been properly argued).
44. Supra note 37 at para. 25 [emphasis in original].
45. 2003 BCCA 297, 13 B.C.L.R. (4") 73.
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enforce a promise by the male defendant to pay the balance of the mortgage
outstanding on the female plaintiff's house if she would come and live
with him, which promise she relied upon to her detriment. The trial judge
followed the dominant line of authority and held that there had to be a
legal relationship existing between the parties at the time the promise was
made, which there was not. The Court of Appeal considered the appellant's
argument that the Court should "extend the application of promissory
estoppel to right a wrong that is otherwise being done," thereby following
"the path already well trod by the courts of New Zealand, Australia, and
the United States, and being opened in England to an equitable remedy for
injurious reliance on a promise intended to bind its maker and to be acted
upon by the promisee, and acted upon by the promisee to the knowledge
of the promisor";46 the appellant cited the American Second Restatement
4 7 and the Australian case of Waltons Stores48 in
of the Law of Contracts
support. In the end, however, the Court avoided the need to decide, as
it held that there was no intention to create legal relations at all in the
circumstances of the case.
Proprietaryestoppel: The constituent elements of proprietary estoppel are
substantially the same as promissory estoppel: a holding out or representation
(either by words, action or inaction) by one person to another, whether it be
about an existing state of facts or a promise about future action; action in
reliance on that holding out by the other; and resulting detriment to the
party acting in reliance.49 The essential differences between the two are,
firstly, that proprietary estoppel requires that the representation be made by
a property owner in relation to land and, secondly, that proprietary estoppel
can be used as a sword as well as a shield (and is sometimes described as
a "quasi-estoppel" for this reason). Indeed, the similarities between the
two types of estoppel are so strong that proprietary estoppel is sometimes
referred to as a simple subset of promissory estoppel: "Proprietary estoppel
is a form of promissory estoppel. It is commonly supposed that estoppel
cannot give rise to a cause of action, but proprietary estoppel appears to be

46. Ibid. at 76-77.
47. S. 90 (1) states: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy
granted for breach may be limited as justice requires."
48. Waltons Stores, supranote 6.
49. See R. Wells, "The Element of Detriment in Proprietary Estoppel" (2001) 65 Conv. 13.
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an exception to that rule." 0 That proprietary estoppel can be used as a sword
as well as a shield was clearly affirmed by the British Columbia Court of
Appeal in Zelmer v. Victor Projects Ltd5 in 1997, an affirmation relied on
in other cases subsequently.
Proprietary estoppel has been applied at the appellate level in Canada
recently, in at least eight cases. Two of the cases used estoppel as a shield,"
and six of them invoked it as a sword." Of the six, one - Zelmer v. Victor
Projects4 - expressly considered and clearly affirmed the principle that
proprietary estoppel can be used as a sword, as mentioned above; and a
concurring judge in another case - Flello v. Baird,involving a boundary
dispute - finessed the distinction between a sword and a shield in a way
that might apply equally to promissory estoppel:
Although the [plaintiffs] raised estoppel in their petition, this is not
truly a case of using that doctrine as a sword rather than a shield. Once
the [defendants] took the position that the [plaintiffs] were trespassing
and threatened action to enforce that position, it was incumbent on the
[plaintiffs] to take steps to regularize the position of the boundary. They
were vulnerable, not only to a possible action by the [defendants], but
to the possibility of the [defendants] disposing of their property to an
innocent purchaser for value. Realistically, the [defendants'] reversal of
position was the sword, the plea of estoppel was the shield.5

Six of the cases, sword and shield alike,5 6 relied on Lord Denning's
judgment in Crabb v. Arun DistrictCouncil,particularly on his statement
that equity "will prevent a person from insisting on his strict legal rights whether arising under a contract, or on his title deeds, or by statute - when
it would be inequitable for him to do so having regard to the dealings
which have taken place between the parties," which dealings he described
on a sliding scale from contractual to non-contractual: firstly, if the person
50. Eberts v. Carleton Condominium Corp. No 396 (2000), 136 O.A.C. 317 at 322-23 (Finlayson
J.A.) [Eberts]. Stephen Smith speaks of courts having "hived off" proprietary estoppel from promissory
estoppel: Stephen A. Smith, Atiyah "sIntroduction to the Law of Contract,6th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2005) at 125.
51. (1997) 147 D.L.R. (41b)216 (B.C.C.A.) [Zelmer].
52. Depew v. Wilkes (2002), 216 D.L.R. (41) 487 (Ont. C.A.) and Montreal Trust Co. v. Williston
Wildcatters Co., 2002 SKCA 91, 10 W.W.R. 633 [Williston Wildcatters].
53. Eberts, supra note 50; Zelmer, supranote 51; Hill v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [1997] 1
S.C.R. 69 [Hill];Flello v. Baird(1999), 172 D.L.R. (4')741 (B.C.C.A.) [Flello];Maritime Telegraph
and Telephone Co. v. ChateauLafleur Development Corp. (2001), 207 D.L.R. (4') 443 (N.S.C.A.),
leave to appeal refused, (2003) 294 N.R. 398n (S.C.C.) [Maritime Telegraph]; and Tretheway-Edge
Dyking Districtv. ConiagasRanches Ltd. (2003), 224 D.L.R. (4') 611 (B.C.C.A.) [Tretheway-Edge].
54. Supra note 51.
55. Supra note 53 at 756-57 (Esson J.A.) [emphasis added].
56. Eberts, supra note 50; Zelmer, supra note 51; Williston Wildcatters,supra note 52; Hill, supra
note 53; Flello, supranote 53; Maritime Telegraph, supra note 53.
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makes a binding contract that he will not insist on his strict legal position;
secondly, if he makes a binding promise short of a contract (i.e., a contract
unenforceable for want of consideration or writing); and thirdly, if"[s]hort
of an actual promise ... he, by his words or conduct, so behaves as to lead
another to believe that he will not insist on his strict legal rights - knowing
or intending that the other willact on that belief- and he does so act...."57
Two of the cases, Zelmer v. Victor Projects58 and Tretheway-Edge
Dyking District v. Coniagas Ranches Ltd,5 9 applied the mistake-based
"five probanda" set out by Fry J. in Willmott v. Barber.60 They did so even
though both cases were cases of estoppel by encouragement, rather than
the mistake-driven estoppel by acquiescence. In the first case, Zelmer, the
court simply quoted the five probanda and then appeared to equate them
to subsequent fraud rather than initial mistake by quoting Scarman U. in
Crabb, who said:
It is to be observed from the passage that I have quoted from the judgment
of Fry J. [in Willmott], that the fraud or injustice alleged does not take
place during the course of negotiation, but only when the defendant
decides to refuse to allow the plaintiff to set up his claim against the
defendants' undoubted right. The fraud, if it be such, arises after the
event, when the defendant seeks by relying on his right to defeat the
expectation which he by his conduct encouraged the plaintiff to have.6
In the second case, Tretheway-Edge, Newbury J. is much more direct:
"I note that the five elements or 'probanda' famously cited by Fry J. in
Willmott v. Barber, including in particular the making of a 'mistake' by a
party as to his or her legal rights, have now been overtaken by a broader
and less literal approach to proprietary estoppel. '62
None of the recent Canadian proprietary estoppel cases is an example
of what has been described diversely as the "paradigm" case 63 or the "most
extreme" case 64 of one person spending money on the property of another
in reliance upon a representation or holding out of obtaining a proprietary

57. [1976] 1 Ch. 179 (C.A.) at 187-88 [Crabb].
58. Supranote5l.
59. Supra note 53.
60. Supra note 8; see accompanying text. The two cases identified the probanda as having being
applied by the Supreme Court of Canada in CanadianSuperiorOil v. Hamnbly, supra note 33.
61. Supra note 57 at 195 as quoted in Zelmer, supra note 51 at 228. Fry J. in Willmott, supranote 8
at 105 introduced his list of probanda as follows: "A man is not to be deprived of his legal rights unless
he has acted in such a way as.would make it fraudulent for him to set up those rights. What, then, are the
elements or requisites necessary to constitute fraud of that description?"
62. Supra note 53 at 627.
63. Cheshire & Burn, supranote 4 at 655.
64. Hanbury & Martin, supranote 4 at 896.
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interest. The closest Canadian example is probably the oft-cited trial-level
decision in Stiles v. Tod Mountain Development Ltd.,65 in which a wouldbe purchaser who had, with the encouragement of the developer, built a
house in a subdivision that eventually did not receive planning approval was
awarded an irrevocable right to remain in occupation of the house until he
was given'clear title to another acceptable lot. Another possible example is
66
the more recent appellate-level case of Deloitte & Touche LLP v. Marino,
in which the defendants claimed that they had spent money paying down
the mortgage and making improvements to their home, the title to which
had vested in the plaintiffs under the Bankruptcy Act, on the strength of the
plaintiff's ongoing assurances that it did not intend to realize on the property;
however, the case was argued and decided (in favour of the defendants) on
the basis of promissory estoppel.
The reason for the paucity of such cases in Canada, when compared
with England, Australia and other Commonwealth jurisdictions, is that
they would usually be decided here on the basis of a remedial constructive
trust. As Fridman put it:
Canadian developments, in effect, have married the original constructive
trust idea to the proprietary or equitable estoppel idea to produce
something that is now quite distinct from both... Canadian decisions
regard those who have provided money, work or services, leading to or
assisting in the acquisition, creation or expansion of wealth or property,
as the beneficiaries of a constructive trust imposed on the one who was
legal owner of the resulting wealth or property. Where an English court
might have resolved the issue by invoking the doctrine of estoppel,
the question of 'compensation' by
Canadian courts have dealt with
67
utilising the constructive trust.
Constructivetrust: Canada, like England, has long recognized the existence
of a constructive trust as an institutional complement to the express trust
in a variety of situations. These situations include unauthorized gains by
a fiduciary, intermeddling in trust property by third parties, breaches of
confidence, profiting from corporate and other opportunities, obtaining
secret commissions and bribes, contracts for the sale of land, and so
on.68 Many but not all of these situations involve a pre-existing fiduciary
relationship. The Supreme Court of Canada, by a slim majority, recently
65.
66.
67.

(1992) 64 B.C.L.R. (2d) 366 (S.C.).
(2004) 72 O.R. (3d) 274 (C.A.).
G.H.L. Fridman, "The Reach of Restitution" (1991) 11 L.S. 304 at 308.

68. See, e.g., A.H. Oosterhoff & E.E. Gillese, Text, Commentary and Cases on Trusts, 5th ed.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1998) at 433-593; Mark R. Gillen & Faye Woodman, eds., The Law of Trusts: A
Contextual Approach (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2000) at 441-98; and Waters, supranote 12 at
489-53 1.
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reaffirmed the continued recognition of the "institutional" constructive
69
trust in Canada, and rationalized its application.
But it is not the institutional constructive trust that is of interest as
a comparator to promissory and proprietary estoppel, but rather the
"remedial" constructive trust. The constructive trust as a remedy for unjust
enrichment was developed slowly by the Supreme Court of Canada through
a number of decisions, and was accepted for the first time by a majority of
the Court in 1980 in Pettkus v. Becker. There Dickson J., speaking for six
of the nine judges, identified unjust enrichment as lying "at the heart of the
constructive trust," and set out the requirements for finding one:
[T]here are three requirements to be satisfied before an unjust enrichment
can be said to exist: an enrichment, a corresponding deprivation and
absence of any juristic reason for the enrichment. This approach, it
seems to me, is supported by general principles of equity that have been
fashioned by the courts for centuries ... 70

Enrichment and deprivation are relatively easy to identify and apply, and
the Supreme Court takes a "straightforward economic approach" to them.71
The former was described by McLachlin J. in Regional Municipality of
Peel v. Canadaas consisting of a tangible benefit conferred by the plaintiff
on the defendant; it can be either a positive benefit, such as the payment
of money, in which case the enrichment is presumed, or a negative benefit,
such as relieving the defendant from an expense which must otherwise
be paid (e.g., paying all household expenses, renovating or maintaining
the property, assuming the burden of caring for young children or elderly
parents, etc.), in which case the benefit must be proved.7 2 Detriment
comprises lost opportunity, and is assumed in the case of financial
contribution but must be proved in the case of the contribution of care and
services.

73

69. Soulos, supra note 17. In this case, the majority of four of seven judges distinguished between
the institutional and remedial constructive trust, holding that unjust enrichment (i.e., a benefit) was
necessary for the latter but not the former. The distinction between the two types of constructive trust
is less clearly drawn in Peel (Regional Municipality)v. Canada, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 762 [Peel].
70. Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834 at 848.
71. Peter v. Beblow, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980 at 990 (McLachlin J.).
72. Peel, supra note 69 at 790. See also Garlandv.Consumers'Gas Co., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 629 at paras.
31, 36 [Garland].
73. E.g., Clarkson v. McCrossenEstate (1995), 3 B.C.L.R. (3d) 80 (C.A.); Wilcox v. Wilcox (2000),
190 D.L.R. (4-) 324 (B.C.C.A.) at para 45: "There is no evidence that she lost or limited employment
to provide the service, or that her opportunities were limited in any way by the care and service she
provided."
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The third requirement - absence of juristic reason for the enrichment
- is the most difficult to assess. Dickson J. described it in Pettkus v. Becker
in terms akin to proprietary estoppel (estoppel by acquiescence):
As for the third requirement, I hold that where one person in a
relationship ... prejudices herself in the reasonable expectation of

receiving an interest in property and the other person in the relationship
freely accepts benefits conferred by the first person in circumstances
where he knows or ought to have known of that reasonable expectation,
74
it would be unjust to allow the recipient of the benefit to retain it.
McLachlin J. expanded upon this in Peter v. Beblow: "It is in connection
with the third element - absence of juristic reason for the enrichment
- that ... the court must consider whether the enrichment and detriment,
morally neutral in themselves, are 'unjust. ' '75 And most recently,
lacobucci J. suggested a two-step approach in Garlandv. Consumers'Gas
Co.: firstly, that the plaintiff make out a primafacie case by proving the
absence of an "established category" of juristic reasons (which include
"acontract ... a disposition of law ... a donative intent ... and other valid
common law, equitable or statutory obligations"); and secondly, that the
de facto burden of proof would then shift to the defendant to rebut the
presumption of unjustness thus raised by pointing to other circumstances
which might constitute a valid juristic reason for the enrichment. The
court would assess the circumstances raised in rebuttal by looking to two
factors, "the reasonable expectations of the parties" and "public policy
76
considerations."
Unjust enrichment, for its part, can be used only as a sword, not a
shield. This flows from its role as a cause of action and is not discussed
in the cases.

74. Supra note 70 at 849. And in Wilcox v. Wilcox, ibid. at para. 46, the British Columbia Court of
Appeal applied the third element in a manner akin to estoppel by encouragement: "Further, [the daughter's
contributions] doubtless were made in expectation of the right of survivorship passing the full title to her,
an expectation expressed by [the mother] to third parties in the presence of [the daughter]. I conclude,
therefore, that there is no juristic reason for the financial enrichment of [the mother]."
75. Supra note 71 at 990.
76. Supra note 72 at paras. 44-46. The Court felt that this two-step procedure, and particularly the
"closed-list" aspect of the first step, responded to the criticism of Lionel Smith (in "The Mystery of
'Juristic Reason' (2000) 12 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 211 at 212-13, 228) that the Canadian requirement
that there be "an absence ofjuristic reason" (in contrast to the English formulation "that the enrichment
be unjust") imposed on the plaintiff the difficult burden of proving a negative. At para. 46 lacobucci J.
stressed, however, that the first-step list was not definitely closed: "It may be that when these factors are
considered, the court will find that a new category ofjuristic reason is established. ... The point here is that
this area is an evolving one and that further cases will add additional refinements and developments." For
a critique of this approach see Mitchell Mclnnes, "Making Sense of Juristic Reasons: Unjust Enrichment
after Garlandv.Consumers'Gas"(2004) 42 Alta. L. Rev. 399.
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The remedial constructive trust is now firmly established in Canada. It
has been applied and fiuther developed by the Supreme Court in a number
of cases since Pettkus v. Becker, not just in decisions concerned with
family property 7 but also in commercial and other disputes.7" English
courts, on the other hand, have eschewed the remedial constructive trust
since the retirement of Lord Denning, 79 in favour of either a "common
intention" constructive trust 'when the plaintiff can prove direct financial
contribution 0 or proprietary estoppel otherwise.
III. Remedies
Promissoryestoppel: Because Canadian courts limit promissory estoppel
to the role of defence to a main action, it does not give rise to any particular
remedial issues. The defence is either successful, or not; the person making
the representation is either estopped from going back on it, or not; and the
main action proceeds apace and gives rise to the remedies appropriate to
it. Canadian courts thus do not have to deal with the issue of principle
of whether the appropriate estoppel remedy should reflect expectation of
gain or simply compensate for loss flowing from the reliance. The general
approach of Australian and American courts, where this issue does arise,

77. E.g., Sorochan v. Sorochan, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 38; Rawluk v. Rawluk, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 70; and Peter
v. Beblow, supranote 71.
78. E.g., Hunter Engineering Co. v. Syncrude CanadaLtd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 426; Lac Minerals Ltd
v. InternationalCorona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574 [Lac Minerals]; Peel, supra note 69; and
Garland,supra note 72. Applying the three requirements in a commercial relationship is harder than
in a domestic one as "the essence of the [commercial] relationship is the enrichment of the participants,
perhaps at the expense of each other"; the standard of fairness in a domestic setting is thus "equality of the
parties" whereas in a business setting it is "honest dealing not equal dealing": Atlas Cabinets& Furniture
Ltd v. National Trust Co. (1990), 68 D.L.R. (4") 161 (B.C.C.A.) at 171 (Lambert J.A.). This can cause
difficulties in cases involving family farm corporations (a common mode of farm ownership in Canada),
which fall somewhere in between commercial and family relationships: Devick v. Devick (2005), 255
D.L.R. (4) 604 (B.C.C.A.).
79. Although the House of Lords recognized unjust enrichment as a distinct cause of action in
Lipkin Gorman v. KarpnaleLtd., [1991] 2 A.C. 548 (H.L.). For subsequent developments, see Andrew
Burrows, "The English Law of Restitution: A Ten-Year Review" in Neyers, McInnes & Pitel, supra
note 2, 11.
80. See, e.g., Simone Wong, "Constructive Trusts over the Family Home: Lessons to be Learned
from Other Commonwealth Jurisdictions?" (1998) 18 L.S. 369, and, by the same author, "When
Trust(s) is Not Enough: An Argument for the Use of Unjust Enrichment for Home-Sharers" (1999) 7
Fern. Legal Stud. 47.
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has been to treat expectation as the upper limit but to award less where
81
necessary to do justice between the parties.
Proprietaryestoppel: The English cases show that the remedies available
to the injured party under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel are varied
and effective. They can be either personal or proprietary in nature, and the
proprietary remedies can range from awarding an equitable charge or lien
on the land, to recognizing an easement over property or a leasehold or life
estate in it, through to awarding a share in the freehold title to the property,
or the title itself- with or even without compensation to the landowner.8" As
Battersby cautioned:
If the court decides in favour of a proprietary interest, it must choose
from the available menu provided by the general law; the court has no
general jurisdiction (and no need) to invent new proprietary interests for
this purpose, and certainly no jurisdiction to declare that a right created
by estoppel (such as a licence) has proprietary effect when a similar right
created expressly by the parties has only personal effect.8 3
Because Canadian courts tend to turn to the constructive trust to remedy
cases of unjust enrichment arising from improvements made to the property
of another, most of the recent Canadian appellate-level proprietary estoppel
84
cases have awarded only limited interests in land, most often easements
requiring payment of compensation in one instance. 5
A difficult remedial issue in proprietary estoppel relates to timing, that
is, to the effect of the proprietary remedy on third parties. The proprietary
remedy, once awarded, of course binds third parties in the normal course of

81. See the discussion in, e.g., C.J. Davis, "Estoppel - Reliance and Remedy" [1995] 59 Conv. 409;
Cooke, supra note 6 at 150ff; Mark Pawlowski, "Satisfying the Equity in Estoppel" (2002) 118 Law
Q. Rev. 519; and Susan Bright & Ben McFarlane, "Proprietary Estoppel and Property Rights" (2005)
64 Cambridge L.J. 449. See also Simon Gardner, "The Remedial Discretion in Proprietary Estoppel
- Again" (2006) 122 Law Q. Rev. 492 (arguing for clearer parameters around the exercise of judicial
discretion).
82. For a principled consideration of when courts should, and do, award proprietary remedies, see
Bright & McFarlane, ibid
83. Graham Battersby, "Contractual and Estoppel Licences as Proprietary Interests in Land" [1991]
55 Cony. 36 at 46-47. A number of English cases, under the influence of Lord Denning, had awarded
an irrevocable licence in land (e.g., Inwards v. Baker, supranote 11), but the Court of Appeal decided in
Ashburn Anstalt v. Arnold, [1989] Ch. I (C.A.) that contractual licences are not interests in land binding
on purchasers, even those who take with notice. Battersby would have the same rule apply to licences
arising on an estoppel (diversely called "equitable licences," "licences by estoppel" or "licences coupled
with an equityl; see to the same effect Megarry & Wade, The Law ofReal Property,6th ed. by Charles
Harpum (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000) at 750-5 1.
84. Hill,supranote 53; Zelmer, supranote 5 ; Flello, supranote 53; Eberts, supranote 50; Maritime
Telegraph, supranote 53; Depew v. Wilkes, supranote 52; and Tretheway-Edge,supra note 53.
85. Depew v. Wilkes, supranote 52.
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events; but what is the situation until it is granted, in the interval between
the raising of the estoppel and the exercise of the court's discretion to
award a proprietary remedy? This issue has not arisen in recent Canadian
cases, and only rarely in English cases. The general consensus among
English academics is to recognize the estoppel claimant as having an
"equity" in the property prior to judgment, which binds third'parties who
86
take with notice of it.
Constructivetrust: The constructive trust raises remedial questions similar
to those raised by proprietary estoppel.8 7 In fact, imposing a trust is just one
of a panoply of measures to remedy an unjust enrichment, some of which
are personal (e.g., compensation for labour performed or goods provided,
accounting for profits) and some of which are proprietary (e.g., a lien or
a trust). As La Forest J. expressed it in Lac Minerals: "While ... '[t]he

principle of unjust enrichment lies at the heart of the constructive trust'
... the converse is not true. The constructive trust does not lie at the heart
of the law of restitution. It is but one remedy, and will only be imposed
in appropriate circumstances."88 The court is thus free to choose the most
appropriate remedy, with a proprietary remedy (the trust) being imposed
where a monetary remedy would be inadequate and the nexus between the
detriment and the property in question is sufficient.89 Generally speaking,
a proprietary remedy is quantified using the "value survived" approach,
while a monetary remedy calls for the "value received" approach unless
this would be unfair in the circumstances (particularly in a rising market
in a family context). 90 These two approaches, which correspond looselyto the difference between equity and debt, echo the estoppel distinction
between remedies based on expectation of gain or compensation for
loss. 9'

As the choice of remedy is discretionary, this poses the same issue
of timing and possible effect on third party interests as with proprietary

86. See, e.g., Cooke, supranote 6 at 130-135.
87. For a thoughtful consideration of the remedial aspects of the constructive trust see Lionel
Smith, "Unravelling Proprietary Restitution" (2004) 40 Can. Bus. L.J. 317 and Andrew Burrows,
"Unravelling Proprietary Restitution: A response to Professor Lionel Smith" (2005) 41 Can. Bus. L.J.
424.
88. Supra note 78 at 674, quoting Dickson C.J. in Pettkus v. Becker, supra note 70 at 847.
89. Sorochanv. Sorochan,supra note 77; Peterv. Beblow, supranote 7 ; Michelin ires (Canada)Ltd.
v. Canada (CA), 2001 FCA 145,3 F.C. 552.
90. E.g., Peterv. Beblow, supra note 71; Hubar v. Jobling, 2000 BCCA 661 195 D.L.R. (41) 123; Bell
v. Bailey (2001), 203 D.L.R. (41")589 (Ont. C.A.); MacFarlanev. Smith, 2003 NBCA 6,256 N.B.R. (2d)
108; Snow v. Marsh, 2004 NSCA 155, 229 N.S.R. (2d) 203; Panarav. DiAscenizo, 2005 ABCA 47, 250
D.L.R. (4) 620.
91. See text accompanying note 80.
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estoppel. When does the constructive trust arise: at the time of the unjust
enrichment or at the time of the court order? The question is still unresolved
in Canada. In Rawluk v. Rawluk,9 2 a majority of four judges of the Supreme
Court of Canada held that a remedial constructive trust exists from the
time the unjust enrichment arises, whereas the other three judges were of
the view that the discretionary nature of the remedy means that a remedial
constructive trust cannot come into existence until the court orders it;
however, even the minority admitted that the property interest so created
might be "extended back" to the time of the enrichment in appropriate
circumstances. What might be considered as appropriate circumstances
under this view is a matter of conjecture.
This issue has been considered in two recent appellate court decisions
from British Columbia. In Leclair v. LeclairEstate,93 a wills variation case,
the Court accepted the majority position in Rawluk that the trust arose at
the time of the unjust enrichment; however, it cautioned that the plaintiff's
proprietary interest did not arise automatically at that time but required a
subsequent court determination of the dual issues of the existence of an
unjust enrichment and of the appropriateness of a trust as the remedy - a
position that arguably is closer to the minority than the majority approach
in Rawluk, albeit with an automatic rather than a discretionary extending
back. In Ellingsen (Trustee in Bankruptcy oJ) v. HallmarkFordSales Ltd.,94
the issue was considered by the two majority judges. One quoted both the
majority and minority decisions in Rawluk without distinguishing between
them; and the second judge acknowledged the difference between the two
approaches but did not think it necessary to chose between them as he (like
the Court in Leclair)regarded a trust arising when declared by the court as
extending back automatically - as having "true retroactive effect" - to the
date when the unjust enrichment arose: "In this case, as in most cases, the
result [between the two approaches] would be the same, which is probably
why the point, as far as I know, must still be regarded as unsettled." 95
Conclusions
What can we conclude about these three concepts, and the interrelationship
between them? Are they, like plants, fundamentally different, somewhat
similar or basically the same? At the most general level, the three are
admittedly fundamentally different, as was mentioned in the introduction,
as one (promissory estoppel) is a defence to an action, another (proprietary
92.
93.
94.
95.

Supra note 77.
(1998), 159 D.L.R. (4") 638 (B.C.C.A.).
2000 BCCA 458, 190 D.L.R. (4"') 47.
Ibid. at para. 70 (Lambert J.A.).
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estoppel) a cause of action as well as a defence, 96 and the third (constructive
trust) simply a remedy to a cause of action. But closer examination reveals
certain underlying similarities among them.
A first-blush look at language and definitional elements suggests
that the closest pairing is between the two estoppels, with the remedial
- or unjust enrichment - constructive trust being only somewhat similar
to them. The estoppels are defined from the point of view of estoppel
claimants, and focus on the detriment suffered by them: in this sense,
they are framed in terms of unjust impoverishment. 97 In contrast, the
remedial constructive trust is a response to unjust enrichment, and thus
focuses on the benefit received by defendants. But this difference between
estoppel and constructive trust is more apparent than real because unjust
impoverishment and unjust enrichment are here two sides of the same coin.
The definition of unjust enrichment is explicit about this, and includes
the need for a counterbalancing detriment (or deprivation) as part of the
formula; and a counterbalancing benefit to the reneging party would seem
implicitly part of estoppel, as the main reason for going back on one's
word would be to obtain a benefit. The definitions of all three - promissory
estoppel, proprietary estoppel and the unjust enrichment which is behind
a constructive trust - are thus more similar than initially appears. Their
similarity is further supported by the fact that their underlying principles,
and especially the grounding of all three in matters of conscience, are
basically the same.
* However, a more detailed look at remedies and especially procedure the sword / shield distinction - suggests that the closest pairing is between
proprietary estoppel and the constructive trust, with promissory estoppel
being the odd concept out.
As for remedies, both proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment can
give rise to proprietary remedies in appropriate circumstances, and timing
is an issue for both. Most attention has focused on the time prior tojudgment,
and on the effect an eventual proprietary remedy can have on third party
dealings taking place in this period. But a closer analysis suggests that
there are three phases to consider - pre-judgment, post-judgment but pre-

96. The multi-faceted nature of estoppel was stressed by the Privy Council in CanadaandDominion
Sugar Co. Ltd. v. CanadianNational (West Indies) Ltd., [1947] A.C. 46 (P.C.) and by Lord Denning,
who declared that estoppel "is not a rule of evidence. It is not a cause of action. It is a principle of
justice and equity": Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. Twitchings, [1975] 3 All E.R. 314 at 323d. See
Kenny D. Anthony, "Which Estoppel in the Law of Saint Lucia?" (1992) 2 Caribbean L. Rev. 154 at
160.
97. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., "The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1" (1936) 46
Yale L.J. 52 at 56.
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execution, and post-execution - with the claimant having different property
interests at each stage. These are a mere equity in the first phase (as the
English proprietary estoppel analysis suggests), an equitable interest in the
second phase (as the Canadian remedial constructive trust stresses), and
a legal interest in the third phase (as is implicit in both jurisdictions). The
hierarchy between these three types of interests - mere equities, equitable
interests and legal interests - is well established in general property law,
and this helps to clarify the rights between the parties, including third
parties, at each phase of the procedure.
As for procedure, it is generally accepted in Canada that although both
proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment can be used to found an action,
promissory estoppel can be invoked only as a defence to an action. In
the final analysis, therefore, whether all three concepts are basically the
same and not just somewhat similar - whether, in botanical terms, they are
different varieties of the same species and not different species of the same
genus - depends on how fundamental the sword / shield distinction is.
Whether or not promissory estoppel should be available as a sword
and not just as a shield raises large issues relating to the integrity of the
law of contracts, and the role of the doctrine of consideration in it. These
issues are obviously too large to attempt to resolve here, 9 but several
general suggestions can be made in light of the preceding comparative
discussion, by someone admittedly more at home in the field of property
law than contract law. A first suggestion is that the operation of promissory
estoppel has enough of a contractual flavour to blur a bright-line distinction
between contract and estoppel. A good example of this contractual flavour
is the notion of "crossing the line," 99 and another is Lord Denning's sliding
scale, or spectrum, in Crabb v. Arun District Council.'°° Where is the
appropriate tipping point between enforceable and unenforceable along
this spectrum?
A second suggestion is that the definitional requirement that a
promissory estoppel affect existing legal relations, 0 1 which prevents
(perhaps designedly so) too great an incursion of the doctrine of estoppel
into the law of contract, need not be regarded as immutable. This recalls
the debate surrounding the recognition of the remedial constructive trust in
Canada, where it was objected that a constructive trust was available only
where there was a pre-existing fiduciary relationship. The Supreme Court
98. See especially Smith, supranote 50 at 106-30 and, by the same author, ContractTheory (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004) at 233-44.
99. See text accompanying note 24.
100. See text following note 56.
101. See text following note 40.
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set aside this requirement when it recognized the remedial constructive
trust in Pettkus v. Becker.
A third suggestion is that barring all use of promissory estoppel as
a sword to preserve the integrity of contract law is over-inclusive. Not
all promissory estoppel cases are contract-based, as the number of recent
Canadian statute-based promissory estoppel cases attest. Moreover,
estoppel was raised in these cases by the plaintiff, to counter the defence's
argument that the action was statute-barred. This comes very close to using
estoppel as a sword, as the distinction between using estoppel as an offence
and using it as a defence to a defence seems fine at best, particularly when
the action would be inadmissible but for the estoppel. 1°2
A final, and more general, suggestion is that it seems odd, even
.unprincipled, to make a fundamental difference in the doctrine of estoppel
between promises relating to land and other promises, and to give more
weight to the former than the latter, in the context of a legal system that
places more formal requirements on dealings with property, especially
land, than on other dealings. Why should the law of contract insist on
a peppercorn when the law of property can overlook the need for seals,
writings, registration, properly attested wills, and so on? Is it because
equity has made greater substantive incursions into property law than into
contract law, and the shield / sword distinction between promissory and
proprietary estoppel is simply a reflection of the difference between law's
formalism and equity's flexibility? Should fusion of the two courts now
attenuate this distinction?

102. See text following note 26.

